‹ Crypto, Trading and Stock Portfolio Tracker SaaS for Investors and Multi-portfolio HoldersQuality report QR-26-00151

Crypto, Trading and Stock Portfolio Tracker SaaS for Investors and Multi-portfolio Holders
Multi-tenant crypto and stock portfolio tracker SaaS with FIFO/average-cost P&L, CSV import and an admin panel.
- Product ID
- B0097-80438
- Builder
- MD FAHIM
- Version reviewed
- 1.0.0 · released 20 Nov 2026
- Stack
- Next.js 16.4 (App Router) with React 19.3 · TypeScript 5 on Node.js 22+ · PostgreSQL 14+ (Neon or self-hosted; Docker uses Postgres 16)
- Built with
- Claude Code, Google Antigravity
- Review period
- 10 Nov 2026 – 20 Nov 2026 · 1 round of changes
- ✓AI code audit6 checks · 10 Nov 2026
- ✓Installed & run20 Nov 2026
- ✓Demo vs delivered20 Nov 2026
- ✓Final sign-off20 Nov 2026
At a glance
- ✓Installed and run from the delivered code — 8 of 8 checks answered yes.
- ✓Live demo compared with the delivered code — 7 of 7 checks answered yes.
- !11 of 15 promised items delivered (setup guide, example config and the rest).
- !Security scored 73/100 with no failing check.
- !5 open warnings — explained in part 1.
AI code audit
The full source archive was read by our AI auditor against each check. It reads the code — it does not run it; running it is part 2.
| Check | What we found | Score | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secrets & credentials | None of the regex candidates are real credentials: the .claude/skills hits are documentation reading process.env, and .env.example uses placeholders. However docker-compose.yml hardcodes a realistic-looking encryption key, scheduler secret, admin password and default DB/MinIO credentials that would ship to buyers and could be deployed unchanged. | 80 | Warning |
| Dependency vulnerabilities | package-lock.json exists, so installs are reproducible, and I cannot confirm any known critical (RCE / auth bypass) vulnerability in the declared versions. However, nearly all dependencies use caret ranges, some packages look suspicious (the 'cn' package, 'shadcn' in runtime deps), and the Docker image and compose file ship with default credentials. I could not verify the installed versions against advisory databases from the digest, so this is a calibrated warning. | 72 | Warning |
| Authorisation & access control | The visible architecture is sound: Argon2id password hashing, hashed session tokens, an authed() wrapper with permission keys, and a tenant-scoped DAL. The bodies of the admin actions, /internal/cron, /media/[id] and the other actions were not provided, so ownership and role checks cannot be confirmed for them. Because of that, the score is capped in the warning band. | 70 | Warning |
| Database access rules | The visible code uses Prisma ORM with a documented tenant-scoped DAL, a sensible FK cascade on Session and PasswordResetToken, and migrations plus a standalone schema.sql. The excerpts omit the DAL, raw queries (job queue FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED), admin actions and schema.sql, so injection safety, unscoped deletes and schema completeness cannot be confirmed. Scoring is capped until those files are reviewed. | 70 | Warning |
| Code structure & duplication | The project separates server actions, server modules, UI components and accounting logic into distinct folders, following a documented structure in CLAUDE.md. The digest is truncated, so file-size and duplication claims cannot be fully verified, and a few hard-coded values and repeated locale lists are visible. | 84 | Pass |
| Build reproducibility | The package manifest, lockfile and Prisma migrations are present, and the build script runs prisma generate before next build. However, the Dockerfile and compose file have coherence problems (no migrations, no bucket creation, dev-only DB init, source copied into the runner), and HowToSetup.md could not be verified for prerequisites or step order from the digest. | 62 | Warning |
Open warnings
Problems that did not stop the listing. They stay on the product page until a later version fixes them.
None of the regex candidates are real credentials: the .claude/skills hits are documentation reading process.env, and .env.example uses placeholders. However docker-compose.yml hardcodes a realistic-looking encryption key, scheduler secret, admin password and default DB/MinIO credentials that would ship to buyers and could be deployed unchanged.
The visible code uses Prisma ORM with a documented tenant-scoped DAL, a sensible FK cascade on Session and PasswordResetToken, and migrations plus a standalone schema.sql. The excerpts omit the DAL, raw queries (job queue FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED), admin actions and schema.sql, so injection safety, unscoped deletes and schema completeness cannot be confirmed. Scoring is capped until those files are reviewed.
The visible architecture is sound: Argon2id password hashing, hashed session tokens, an authed() wrapper with permission keys, and a tenant-scoped DAL. The bodies of the admin actions, /internal/cron, /media/[id] and the other actions were not provided, so ownership and role checks cannot be confirmed for them. Because of that, the score is capped in the warning band.
package-lock.json exists, so installs are reproducible, and I cannot confirm any known critical (RCE / auth bypass) vulnerability in the declared versions. However, nearly all dependencies use caret ranges, some packages look suspicious (the 'cn' package, 'shadcn' in runtime deps), and the Docker image and compose file ship with default credentials. I could not verify the installed versions against advisory databases from the digest, so this is a calibrated warning.
The package manifest, lockfile and Prisma migrations are present, and the build script runs prisma generate before next build. However, the Dockerfile and compose file have coherence problems (no migrations, no bucket creation, dev-only DB init, source copied into the runner), and HowToSetup.md could not be verified for prerequisites or step order from the digest.
Requirement list
What the builder agreed to deliver before uploading — 11 of 15 met.
- Complete source for every component Met
- No real credentials in the archive Met
- Builds from a clean machine Partial
- Database script or migrations Met
- Authentication and roles on every mutating endpoint Partial
- Pinned dependencies without critical CVEs (nice)Partial
- Documentation set (nice)Met
- Working live demo Partial
- README.md Met
- HowToSetup.md Met
- CLAUDE.md (or AGENTS.md) (nice)Met
- CHANGELOG.md (nice)Met
- .env.example Met
- a project file Met
- a project file (nice)Met
Human review
Reviewers from the Vibe96 team in Dubai worked through each question below; a final reviewer signed it off.
Stage 1 — Installed and run from the delivered code
Completed 20 Nov 2026A reviewer installed the product on a clean machine, following only the guide that ships with it.
| Question | Answer | Reviewer's note |
|---|---|---|
| Packages restored without errors | Yes | |
| Solution builds clean | Yes | |
| Database created from the shipped script or migrations | Yes | |
| First sign-in works with the documented steps | Yes | |
| Setup guide is accurate and complete | Yes | |
| Every module in the feature list opens and works | Yes | |
| No real secrets in the archive | Yes | |
| Branding and company details can be changed without code | Yes |
Stage 2 — Live demo compared with the delivered code
Completed 20 Nov 2026A second reviewer checked that what the listing and demo show is what the buyer receives.
| Question | Answer | Reviewer's note |
|---|---|---|
| Demo URL is reachable | Yes | |
| Demo credentials work | Yes | |
| Demo runs the same version as the archive | Yes | |
| All five differentiators are visible in the demo | Yes | |
| Screenshots match the demo | Yes | |
| Nothing in the demo is missing from the code | Yes | |
| Datasheet claims are accurate | Yes |
Changes asked for during review
- Round 1: changes requested on 13 Nov 2026; the builder fixed them and uploaded again.
- Sign-off: approved for sale on 20 Nov 2026 with 5 warnings shown publicly.
What this report covers — and what it doesn't
- It covers version 1.0.0 exactly as the buyer downloads it: the source archive, the setup guide and the live demo on the dates above.
- It is not a penetration test, a performance or load test, or a legal review of third-party package licences.
- Scores are a point in time. Libraries age; a later version is audited again and gets its own report.
- Your setup matters. Hosting, configuration and changes made after purchase are outside this review.
- How the score is made: each AI check is scored 0–100 and weighted (security counts most). A listing needs 75 or more, no failing check, and the human review passed.
- Always try the live demo before buying, and ask the builder questions from the product page.
Vibe96 FZ-LLC, Dubai, UAE. This report describes the product at the time of review and is not a warranty.